“What the philosophers and theologians have to say, relevant to the matter in hand, can be given only in resumé. That man has the duty not only of individual but also of social worship, is elementary Catholic doctrine . . . even the state, qua state, not simply ‘society’ but the politically organized community, civil society as such, is bound to profess religion, the true religion; to worship God in the way He wills to be worshipped; and is so bound by the natural law.”
Appreciating the Danger of American Liberalism
Before presenting the careful analysis of Fr. George Shea, later named a Monsignor, who is the focus of this essay, we must introduce the context and influence of the man whose ideas he was critiquing. The same man whose views on Church-state relations dominated the American church in the lead-up to the Second Vatican Council, none other than Fr. John Courtney Murray. A Jesuit theologian who, while in Italy in 1950, met with Msgr. Giovanni Battista Montini (later to become Paul VI) and found sympathy for his “orientations”, and whom Fr. Murray reported as wanting “his hand to be strengthened.”1
Unfortunately, and despite his sincerity—which if anything made him more, not less, dangerous—Fr. Murray was by all evidence a “liberal Catholic” and convinced that the revolutionary and American notions of “religious freedom” could be reconciled with Papal condemnations of the same, along with Catholic doctrine on liberalism, Church-state relations, religious tolerance and the objective duties of the State, qua State, to worship God in the true religion. For unsuspecting Catholics, the distinction that Fr. Murray drew between the liberalism of the European continent, which he correctly saw as condemned, and the apparently sound American constitutional and political principles—no less liberal and differing only in degree, not kind—was compelling. However, in reality, American liberalism was not only less honest than its European counterpart, which was openly hostile to religion and anti-clerical, but more dangerous since it masked its poison under the cover of false notions of tolerance, the error of freedom of conscience and the evil of freedom of worship.
Though Fr. Murray was censored for his writing in the 1950s2 by the Holy Office and its head, Cd. Alfredo Ottaviani, influenced in no small way by the prompting of Fr. Joseph Clifford Fenton, it was only possible after the death of Pope Pius XII that he be rehabilitated. This new, open atmosphere in the Church, what was termed aggiornamento “updating”, came with the election of Pope John XXIII and gave life to the revolutionary Nouvelle théologie “New Theology” which had previously been condemned in Humani Generis and criticized by eminent theologians, notably the Dominican master, Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange. A “rethinking” of Church-state relations was now also possible, which would “move past” the old model whereby the civil and ecclesiastical powers—though distinct and the former subordinated indirectly to the latter, which is essentially concerned with man’s supernatural end—were to work harmoniously in union, each exercising supremacy in their respective spheres.3
In line with this, Fr. Murray, not content with accepting that religious freedom found in our country, America, was an objectively evil situation, one repugnant to mere reason unaided by the superior light of Faith, doggedly advanced theses which ignored the grave obligations outlined by Pope Leo XIII of the State under natural law:
Wherefore, civil society must acknowledge God as its Founder and Parent, and must obey and reverence His power and authority, justice therefore forbids, and reason itself forbids, the State to be godless; or to adopt a line of action which would end in godlessness—namely, to treat the various religions alike, and to bestow upon them promiscuously equal rights and privileges (emphasis added).4
Motivated in large part by ecumenical impulses,5 the American situation in Fr. Murray’s mind was no longer an affront to the rights of the Catholic Church which are the rights of God, but was the ideal for Church-state relations in the modern world, simultaneously in harmony with the natural law and Catholic doctrine, whereas it was previously contrary to both. One is reminded of the old Americanist spirit which conceived of a “Church in America to be different from what it is in the rest of the world”,6 championing the idea that it would always and everywhere be “universally lawful or expedient for State and Church to be, as in America, dissevered and divorced”.7
The Origin of Dignitatis Humanæ and Murray’s Influence
More evidence of Fr. Murray’s liberal thinking and spirit are his meaningful contributions8 to the conciliar document promulgated on December 7, 1965 by Paul VI, Dignitatis Humanæ, of which Murray was a principal architect.9 In anticipation of the Second Vatican Council, Pope John XXIII had ordered the creation of a Preparatory Commission, headed by the distinguished head of the Holy Office, Cd. Ottaviani, to produce schemas on a variety of topics. Once the council began, however tragically, many of the progressivist Fathers and theologians attacked them for their Scholastic character, rigidity and the opposition to modern ideas.10 All of these schema were, save for the one on sacred liturgy, summarily discarded and new ones were drafted by council revolutionaries.11 In the theologian camp of revolutionaries, the big names were Frs. Congar, Daniélou, de Lubac, Küng, Rahner and Ratzinger.12 Many of these characters were suspected of heterodoxy or were outright censored under the pontificate of Pope Pius XII. A notable example and relevant to our focus is the original schema of the “Constitution on the Church”, whose ninth chapter contained a standard, scholastic recapitulation of Catholic doctrine, “On the Relations of Church and State”, but was replaced by the text “On Religious Liberty”, the immediate precursor to Dignitatis Humanæ. Fr. Joseph Thomas, writing in the pages of National Catholic Reporter and published at EWTN, summarizes the influence of Fr. Murray on this text nicely:
Belgian Bishop Émile-Joseph De Smedt, speaking on behalf of the Secretariat for Christian Unity, gave a lengthy speech explaining the draft to the Council. Bishop De Smedt’s discourse reflected the thought of American theologian, Jesuit Father John Courtney Murray, who in April of 1963 had been appointed to serve as an expert in the elaboration of the document.13
Unlike the original schema, this text was produced within the Secretariat for Christian Unity, headed by Cd. Augustin Bea, which was a body that agitated for unbridled ecumenism throughout the entirety of the Council. We have previously analyzed Dignitatis Humanæ, adding our methodological argument to the, frankly, devastating critique made by Fr. Hervé Belmont:
On the other hand, Fr. Murray, in his reflection on the significance of Dignitatis Humanæ struck a different tune:
It can hardly be maintained that the Declaration is a milestone in human history—moral, political, or intellectual. The principle of religious freedom has long been recognized in constitutional law, to the point where even Marxist-Leninist political ideology is obliged to pay lip-service to it. In all honesty it must be admitted the Church is late in acknowledging the validity of the principle. […] The Church does not deal with the secular order in terms of a double standard—freedom for the Church when Catholics are in a minority, privilege for the Church and intolerance for others when Catholics are a majority. The Declaration has opened the way toward new confidence in ecumenical relationships, and a new straightforwardness in relations between the Church and world (emphasis added).14
Passing over the irony that, far from being a mark in favor of its orthodoxy, the reconciliation between Dignitatis Humanæ and communist ideology would be a mark against it,15 Fr. Murray is apparently unaware, or perhaps did not care, about another absurdity: namely, that the Roman Catholic Church, which uniquely claims itself as the only ark of salvation, having an exclusive, divine right to propaganda and unique mission from Jesus Christ to bring all nations the pure Gospel, can now legitimately be put on the same level before the State—even having the same rights—with all other religions, which are necessarily false. Consequently, the indifferent State is legitimized and made normative, in a universal way, i.e. independent of any and all contingent circumstances. The exact opposite of the mandate of the Social Kingship of Jesus Christ.16
As a testament to the endurance of Fr. Murray’s vision and his liberal ideas, we only need to review the public speeches of John Paul II and the official teaching of Benedict XVI to see how closely their views match his. In the 1988 speech on the Day of World Peace, John Paul II assured the audience there could be no double standard, invoking the universality of a constitutionally protected right to freedom of conscience, for “all citizens” and existing in the external forum (which is an important distinction). After implicitly condemning the holy practice of Christendom and the anti-liberal Popes of the 19th and 20th centuries, “[the State cannot arrogate to itself the right to… impede the profession or public practice of religion by a person or a community”, he went further and warned against a confessional State, as such:
Even in cases where the State grants a special juridical position to a particular religion, there is a duty to ensure that the right to freedom of conscience is legally recognized and effectively respected for all citizens, and also for foreigners living in the country even temporarily for reasons of employment and the like (emphasis added).17
As for Benedict XVI, drawing on the Council, his official teaching in the 2013 post-synodal apostolic exhortation outlined why religious tolerance—which presupposes an evil to be endured and was so clearly outlined by Pope Leo XIII18—had been overcome in favor of “religious freedom”, with its attendant and universal demands:
Religious freedom is the pinnacle of all other freedoms. It is a sacred and inalienable right. It includes on the individual and collective levels the freedom to follow one’s conscience in religious matters and, at the same time, freedom of worship. It includes the freedom to choose the religion which one judges to be true and to manifest one’s beliefs in public.
…
Religious tolerance exists in a number of countries, but it does not have much effect since it remains limited in its field of action. There is a need to move beyond tolerance to religious freedom (emphasis added).19
Yet these quotations are the epitome of liberalism, a heresy in the doctrinal and practical order,20 that Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange exposed and which we previously made available to our readers:
As distinguished from the indifferentism explained above, liberalism, which was accepted by liberal Catholics, the disciples of F. de Lamennais, defends the civil liberty of every cult, as a condition of society not in itself disordered, but conforming to reason and the spirit of the Gospel, and as most useful. For although liberal Catholics admit that the Catholic Church was divinely instituted, they teach that full liberty must be granted to it, but that nothing more is owed to it. “For true religion, as they say, will be propagated and flourished by persuasion alone; let many embrace it, and indeed with the greater liberty, and therefore with the greater trust and love, the less coercion there will be, since truth always prevails over error.”
…
Here liberalism can be defined: the doctrine according to which civil and social authority is not bound to accept a sufficiently proposed divine revelation, but can remain neutral between true and false religions, without submission to divine positive laws revealed supernaturally. It is a form of social naturalism: temporal society is not bound to subordinate its proximate end to a supernatural end.21
A stark contrast is readily apparent to any unprejudiced mind.
Just like Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange, it is no surprise to find Cd. Ottaviani in the “double standard camp”, the same which John Paul II had lamented. In response to the controversy brewing in America from Fr. Murray’s writings, Ottaviani acknowledged and affirmed this modus operandi of the Church with regard to how she relates to non-Catholic states, candidly stating truth and error are to be measured with different, not equal, weights.22 Put negatively, it meant recognizing the error of maintaining that false religions should enjoy the same rights from the State as Catholicism, along with the protection and favor of public authority, unlike Fr. Murray who believed the opposite and was relieved Dignitatis Humanæ had overcome this “contradiction”.
What this translates to, practically, is when Catholics are in the minority, we ask for religious freedom—belonging uniquely to us—according to the principles of the majority, who do not dare to claim dogmatic certitude (they admit they could be mistaken) about their priors. On the other hand, when Catholics are in the majority or in a position where it is prudent, we work to repress religious freedom by way of establishing Catholicism as the State religion, which is most pleasing to God, simultaneously enacting legal penalties against the public (distinct from private) expression of religious and moral error. Consider, what could be as destructive in a society as religious disunity (i.e. moral and dogmatic anarchy), from which all other unities are related—to a greater or lesser extent—and must be subordinated?
Murray, Meet Shea
In greater detail and with exact citations, the liberalizing theses of Fr. Murray will now be dissected by Fr. Shea, our featured writer. Writing in 1950 as a professor of dogmatic theology at Immaculate Conception Seminary in Darlington, New Jersey, Fr. Shea exposed the departure of Murray’s ideas from not only the Church-approved, orthodox manuals of public law, but also Catholic philosophy and dogmatic theology. All of this, of course, to say nothing of the ecclesiastical magisterium which is the most important and universal criterion of truth.23 In a hint at what is to come, after Fr. Shea surveyed numerous authoritative theological works, we read his conclusion:
Given these facts, the state, in conformity with its obligation under natural law to profess the true religion, to worship God as He decrees (‘the hypothetical obligation of accepting a higher belief, law, and mode of worship, if God reveals them as His will’), has then the duty of accepting Catholicism, its creed, code, cult. The objective duty exists for all; and where the objective duty is sufficiently known, the duty is subjective as well (emphasis added).
Refreshingly, this sound doctrine is only matched by its Scholastic clarity, functioning doubly as the chief bulwark against profane novelty and heterodoxy. Once abandoned, the door is left open for revolutionaries and innovators to make their way into the inner chamber, so to speak, as outlined above. The aforementioned Fr. Fenton, who would later serve as Cd. Ottaviani’s peritus “theological expert” at the Second Vatican Council and whose harrowing account of the same is a must-read, agreed with Shea’s analysis, giving his thoughts in the “Status of a Controversy” article published in the American Ecclesiastical Review.24
Now, without further ado, The Journal of American Reform is pleased to present this invaluable analysis from Msgr. Shea, critiquing the heterodox ideas advanced by Fr. Murray in his various writings on religious freedom and Church-state relations.
Catholic Doctrine and “The Religion of the State”
What is the veritable Catholic “thesis” on Church-state relationships? More precisely, what, in reality, is the authentic, perennially valid and unalterable Catholic doctrine concerning the relations between Catholic Church and Catholic state, the relations which should per se obtain by reason of the nature of Church and state in a Catholic society, so that any deviation from these relations, while tolerable perhaps as a concession prompted by expediency, could not merit approval on principle? This question, then, confines itself to theory, to principles, and in turn it is to this question so put (or aspects of it) that the following pages confine themselves. That is to say, it is altogether beyond the scope of this brief paper to discuss what concessions may be made in practice, what departures from the principles, the theory, the norm, would be legitimate and in order in various concrete circumstances.
The answer to be given to the foregoing question is currently a matter of lively debate among Catholic theologians. On the one hand, claiming to be the authentic Catholic “thesis,” there is what its opponents term the “old thesis,” “the nineteenth-century thesis,” though in substance it is still the teaching generally presented in manuals of theology and of Jus Publicum Ecclesiasticum, even those of most recent vintage.25 On the other hand, there are the views of several Catholic scholars, here and abroad, who, after a searching re-examination of the “old thesis,” have contended that it needs radical revision, substantial modifications. Pre-eminent among the champions of these more liberal views is John Courtney Murray, S.J., who has brought to bear against the “old thesis” impressive erudition, remarkable dexterity, and an uncommon command of language.26 Withal, it must be asked: Has Fr. Murray, to date, successfully vanquished the “old thesis” in any of its essentials? If one who claims no special competence in the matter be allowed to venture an opinion, I would say that he has not. For whatever they are worth, some reasons for this opinion are respectfully submitted in the following pages, as simply and briefly as a complicated controversy permits.
I.
A key issue in the whole debate is the standing, within the framework of Catholic doctrine, of the constitutional concept of “the religion of the state.”27 For the concept itself, we may turn to Fr. Murray:
As it has historically appeared in the nation-states of post-Reformation Europe, this concept asserts that the state itself, the organized political community does more than recognize the juridical personality of the Church as a visible religious society in her own right, with autonomous powers and definite rights over her members; by itself this recognition would not make the Church the religion of the state. The concept also asserts that the state as such makes public profession of Catholicism as its own one and only religion; and by consequence it asserts that no citizen may make public profession of any other religion. In further consequence, the coercive power of the state is brought to bear to inhibit the public profession or propaganda of other religions.28
What is under discussion is the state when it is the body-politic of a Catholic people. And the problem before us comes to this: Is the official and exclusive recognition and profession of Catholicism by the state, with whatever logical and juridical consequences—as regards other religions—may follow from such a constitutional situation of “religion of the state,” permanently and unalterably part of the genuine Catholic “thesis,” obligatory from the nature of Church and state in a Catholic society? “Is it . . . the theologically necessary, permanently valid, unalterably ideal realization of Catholic principles on Church-state relationships?”29
Fr. Murray’s answer is in the negative. He takes the position that a constitutional situation of “the religion of the state” is at most obligatory only if and insofar as it is a means necessary to ensure the freedom of the Church.30 With this as his major premise, Fr. Murray then argues, in effect: Now, the future may hold undreamed-of modes of government wherein the freedom of the Church would be guaranteed without need of recourse to a constitutional situation of “the religion of the state”31—“indeed, such a mode is already with us, in modern democracy, of the better sort.32 Ergo, “the religion of the state,” since it is but a particular and contingent manner of realizing the Church’s freedom, does not enjoy a necessary and permanent status in Catholic doctrine.
With this conclusion in hand, Fr. Murray considers that Catholic principles leave room for a body-politic of a Catholic people which would be, not a “Catholic state,” but a “lay state,”33 somewhat on the following order, I gather: one wherein, to be sure, the state would reckon with the reality of the Church,34 would recognize the unique juridical personality of the Church and the existence, in an order higher than that of the state, of an external spiritual authority that has an independent sovereignty over all its subjects in all that concerns their spiritual and moral life, even as citizens and rulers,35 wherein there would be right moral and juridical relationships between the Church and the state,36 and to that extent no separation of Church and state,37 wherein, however, Catholicism would not be “the religion of the state,” would not be publicly professed by the state as its own one and only religion, and in consequence without inhibition by the state of public profession or propaganda of other religions.38 Such a relationship of Church and state, Fr. Murray holds, is called for by a modern democracy, whose historical emergence is said to correspond to a fundamental intention of nature39 (and therefore of God), and which would collapse, it is to be feared, if public profession or propaganda of false religions be inhibited.40
Before accepting all this, one would like, among other things, to be sure about the validity of Fr. Murray’s initial premise: there is room for considerable doubt that the theological necessity or non-necessity of “the religion of the state” depends solely on the latter’s necessity or non-necessity for the freedom of the Church. To be fair, Fr. Murray has not simply assumed the truth of this premise. On the contrary, he has made valiant efforts to dispose of various conceivable objections against his major premise, i.e., arguments wishing to vindicate the theological necessity of “the religion of the state” whether the Church’s freedom be at stake or not. That these efforts have been successful in every case, I am not sure. Happily, however, there is no need to go into all that as long as a simpler course is available of asking whether Fr. Murray has considered all the arguments.
Thus, on the question of the theological necessity or non-necessity of “the religion of the state” one would like to see some explicit discussion of the possible implications of a “major obligation which natural law imposes on the State that is, on organized the obligation to society with its agencies of government . . . knowledge God as its author, to worship Him as He wills to be worshipped, and to subject its official life and action to His law,” which “absolute obligation includes also the hypothetical obligation of accepting a higher belief, law, and mode of worship, if God reveals them as His will.”
As to this obligation itself, whatever its implications may be, Fr. Murray undoubtedly concedes it, since the words just quoted derive from an earlier article of his41 and do but sum up what is classic and certain doctrine among Catholic philosophers42 and theologians,43 doctrine confirmed by the Popes, as will be seen later.
What the philosophers and theologians have to say, relevant to the matter in hand, can be given only in resumé. That man has the duty not only of individual but also of social worship, is elementary Catholic doctrine.44 In treating of this obligation of social worship, authors go on to affirm that even the state, qua state, not simply “society” but the politically organized community, civil society as such, is bound to profess religion, the true religion; to worship God in the way He wills to be worshipped; and is so bound by the natural law. It is understood, of course, that the state is a moral person, able to be the subject of duties, and to fulfill them, only through the medium of physical persons, the individual members who compose it. Concretely, then, the state professes, exercises religion, worships God, through official acts of those placed in authority. To satisfy its religious obligations, the state must worship God not only indirectly, virtually, administratively, but also directly and formally.45 That is to say, not only, for example, by abstaining from whatever is contrary to divine law, not only by positive furtherance of public religion, not only by legislation, ex motivo religionis, against perjury, public blasphemy, writings inimical to public religion and morality, etc., but also by official participation in acts of worship properly so-called—of adoration, thanksgiving, supplication, and the like. The basic argument for all this, employed to prove the state’s obligation of direct and formal divine worship in addition to that of worshipping indirectly, virtually, administratively,46 since it is more fully stated in papal utterances below, may thus be given in barest essence.
The state is a creature of God, for He is the author of man’s social nature, of all authority in the state, of all the benefits the state enjoys; therefore, the state must acknowledge its dependence on God, by appropriate acts of worship. If the state be, indeed, “of the natural law,” one can hardly dispute this argument. Further, one perceives that, if it holds for any state, the argument holds for all—for all forms, those known and those undreamed-of, for juridical democracy and for any other new realizations in the reality of the “state” which historical evolution has brought or may yet bring about.
To continue the resumé—the state is no less a creature of God, and therefore no less bound to worship Him, for all that the actual order of things is a supernatural order, that a supernatural religion, the Catholic, has been revealed as obligatory for all men, that a supernatural religious society, the Catholic Church, has been divinely instituted for the worship of God. Given these facts, the state, in conformity with its obligation under natural law to profess the true religion, to worship God as He decrees (“the hypothetical obligation of accepting a higher belief, law, and mode of worship, if God reveals them as His will”), has then the duty of accepting Catholicism, its creed, code, cult. The objective duty exists for all; and where the objective duty is sufficiently known, the duty is subjective as well. This latter obtains in the case of a Catholic society. For in such case the state is not in the position of having to discover the true religion. It does not have to seek for that which has been found and is known in advance by the Catholic people of which the state is the body-politic. It has rather but to acknowledge what the Catholic populace acknowledges, the divine institution of the Catholic Church.47 That the state finds the Church in this wise, indirectly, through the medium of the Catholic citizenry, does not mean that the state has no direct duties towards the Church. For, in the supernatural order no less than in the natural, the state remains a creature of God, and, as such, and as a perfect society really distinct from the Church, has its own duty of divine homage, of worshipping God as He wills to be worshipped, a duty which the state cannot fulfill apart from the Church.
Such would seem to be the mind of the representative authors we have been consulting. What are the implications of all this as to the question of the theological necessity of “the religion of the state”? It is difficult to understand why the foregoing considerations should not call for the conclusion that, in a Catholic society, it is incumbent upon the state to be a “Catholic state,” to declare and to treat Catholicism as “the religion of the state.” The formal, official, and exclusive recognition and profession of Catholicism by the state in a Catholic society as its own one and only religion, in short, the establishment of Catholicism as “the religion of the state,” seems necessarily contained in the very notion of the state’s duty to accept and profess the true religion, therefore Catholicism, with its creed, code, and cult. How else could the state, qua state, in truth accept and profess Catholicism, together with its tenet that it alone is the true religion?
If such a conclusion be conceded, one must then face up to the problem of what ought to be the state’s attitude toward, and dealings with, the heterodox: the problem of what “logical and juridical consequences,” as regards sects, should flow from the situation of Catholicism as “the religion of the state.” Before a further word is said on this subject, let it be noted at once that no Catholic holds or may hold that the state would be called upon to impose the Catholic faith on dissident citizens. Reverence for the individual conscience forbids this, and the very nature of religion and of the act of faith. If these be not voluntary, they are nought.48 Further, it is agreed to by all that the members of sects must be permitted the private external exercise of their religion. Neither of these points, then, enters into the question, when one comes to debate the problem of the “logical and juridical consequences” of Catholicism as “the religion of the state.” What is, however, very much in question, is this: Would the Catholic state be under moral obligation (per se—as was stated at the very outset, our whole discussion has been moving at the level of principles) to restrict sects in such matters as the public profession and exercise of their false religion, in their propaganda, the spread of their heretical doctrines?
It is no secret that the defenders of the “old thesis” answer in the affirmative. They consider such action by the state inherent in the logic of the state’s duty to accept and profess Catholicism, a necessary consequence of the situation of Catholicism as “the religion of the state.”49 And that it was the mind of Pius XI that “the religion of the state” entailed some manner of sectarian restriction, is candidly acknowledged by Fr. Murray.50 To counter certain utterances of Mussolini anent the import of the Lateran Pacts (Treaty and Concordat), the Pope, in his letter of May 30, 1929, to Cardinal Gasparri, published in the Osservatore Romano on June 5, 1929—two days before the formal ratification of the Lateran Pacts—forcefully insisted that it be “clearly and loyally understood that the Catholic religion, and it alone, according to the Statute and the Treaties, is the religion of the state with the logical and juridical consequences of such a situation of constitutional law, especially with reference to propaganda”; and the Pope went on to add that full liberty of discussion is inadmissable, since some forms of discussion can easily trick unenlightened minds and become a cloak for harmful propaganda.51
What Fr. Murray himself actually holds in his particular matter is not altogether clear. When he has occasion to refer to such “consequences,” he is inclined to add some qualifications, as when he writes, “logical and juridical consequences’ that have historically followed from that concept [“religion of the state”]”;52 or when he puts it that these consequences have been “considered ‘logical.’”53 On the other hand, I have not noted any assertion of Fr. Murray that such consequences are not, in truth, “logical.” In the light of the utterances of Pius XI, given above, and of other Popes, to be quoted presently, such reticence is understandable. Fr. Murray has been able to avoid facing up to the problem by disputing the basic supposition of the problem, the theological necessity of “the religion of the state”:
Finally, the question is not whether, in a “constitutional situation” wherein is enshrined the concept of “religion of the state,” there follow certain “logical and juridical consequences” with regard to the suppression of other forms of belief and worship.
For the theologian, the basic question concerns that constitutional situation itself is it or is it not the theologically necessary, permanently valid, unalterably ideal realization of Catholic principles on Church-state relationships?... Surely the answer must be no.54
But what if the answer must be yes? To ask this question has been one of the reasons for this paper.
II.
It is time now that the Popes be heard on the matters under discussion in this paper. I single out a few of the relevant utterances, notably of Leo XIII. That this Pontiff more than once approved the concept of “the religion of the state” is conceded by Fr. Mur-ray, who contends, however (if I understand him correctly, and may sum up his views in my own words), that Leo XIII did not thereby wish to teach the theological necessity of “the religion of the state” his approval of the latter was given only because and insofar as “the religion of the state” was then necessary to ensure the well-being of the Church, and of the state as well, against the onslaughts of Continental Liberalism.55 I am prepared to grant that Leo XIII may have approved “the religion of the state” for contingent reasons; but I am not prepared to grant that he approved it for such reasons alone. To my mind, in his vindication of “the religion of the state” the Pope adduced at least one doctrinal reason, of permanent validity, for “the religion of the state,” and thereby taught the theological necessity of the latter. The reason? The state, qua state, must worship God, because it is a creature of God.
In the Encyclical Humanum genus, Apr. 20, 1884, the Pontiff declared:
To have in public matters no care for religion, and in the arrangement and administration of civil affairs to have no more regard for God than if He did not exist, is a rashness unknown to the very pagans. . . . Human society, indeed, for which by nature we are formed, has been constituted by God the Author of nature; and from Him, as from their principle and source, flow in all their strength and permanence the countless benefits with which society abounds. As we are each of us admonished by the very voice of nature to worship God in piety and holiness, as the Giver unto us of life and of all that is good therein, so also and for the same reason, nations and States (populi et civitates) are bound to worship Him; and therefore it is clear that those who would absolve society (civilem communitatem) from all religious duty act not only unjustly but also with ignorance and folly.56
More instructive still is the Encyclical Immortale Dei, issued Nov. 1, 1885:
As a consequence, the State (civitatem), constituted as it is, is clearly bound to act up to the manifold and weighty duties linking it to God, by the public profession of religion. Nature and reason, which command every individual devoutly to worship God in holiness, because we belong to Him and must return to Him since from Him we came, bind also the civil community by a like law. For men living together in society are under the power of God no less than individuals are, and society, not less than individuals, owes gratitude to God, who gave it being and maintains it, and whose ever-bounteous goodness enriches it with countless blessings. Since, then, no one is allowed to be remiss in the service due to God, and since the chief duty of all men is to cling to religion in both its teaching and practice—not such religion as they may have a preference for, but the religion which God enjoins, and which certain and most clear marks show to be the only one true religion—it is a public crime to act as though there were no God. So, too, is it a sin in the State not to have care for religion, as a something beyond its scope, or as of no practical benefit; or out of many forms of religion to adopt that one which chimes in with the fancy; for we [better: “they”—civilates . . . debent] are bound absolutely to worship God in that way which He has shown to be His will. All who rule, therefore, should hold in honor the holy name of God, and one of their chief duties must be to favor religion, to protect it. . . .57
Later in the same Encyclical, Leo XIII cites as reprehensible the views:
The State (civitas) does not consider itself bound by any kind of duty towards God. Moreover, it believes that it is not obliged to make public profession of any religion; or to inquire which of the very many religions is the only one true; or to prefer one religion to all the rest; or to show to any form of religion special favor; but, on the contrary, is bound to grant equal rights to every creed, so that public order may not be disturbed by any particular form of religious belief.58
Perhaps most significant of all is the passage in the same Pontiff’s Encyclical Libertas, June 20, 1888:
This kind of liberty (liberty of cult), if considered in relation to the State, clearly implies that there is no reason why the State should offer any homage to God, or should desire any public recognition of Him; that no one form of worship is to be preferred to another, but that all stand on an equal footing, no account being taken of the religion of the people, even if they profess the Catholic faith. But, to justify this, it must needs be taken as true that the State has no duties towards God, or that such duties, if they exist, can be abandoned with impunity, both of which assertions are manifestly false. For it cannot be doubted but that, by the will of God, men are united in civil society; whether its component parts be considered; or its form, which implies authority; or the object of its existence; or the abundance of the vast services which it renders to man. God it is who has made man for society, and has placed him in the company of others like himself, so that what was wanting to his nature, and beyond his attainment if left to his own resources, he might obtain by association with others. Wherefore civil society (civilis societas, quia societas est) must acknowledge God as its Founder and Parent, and must obey and reverence His power and authority. Justice therefore forbids, and reason itself forbids, the State to be godless; or to adopt a line of action which would end in godlessness—namely, to treat the various religions (as they call them) alike, and to bestow upon them promiscuously equal rights and privileges. Since, then, the profession of one religion is necessary in the State, that religion must be professed which alone is true, and which can be recognized without difficulty, especially in Catholic States, because the marks of truth are, as it were, engraven upon it. . . .59
There is room for but one more relevant pronouncement of the Popes. Pius X wrote in his Encyclical Vehementer nos, Feb. 11, 1906:
That the State should be separated from the Church is an absolutely false and most pernicious thesis. For first, since it is based on the principle that religion should be of no concern to the State, it does a grave injury to God, He who is the founder and conserver of human society no less than He is of individual men, for which reason He should be worshipped not only privately but also publicly.60
As I see it, these various papal pronouncements bear upon the state, qua state; not simply on “society” considered as the prepolitical “matter” to which the state imparts a political “form.” The state, to which man’s God-given social nature impels him, is a creature of God, and as such is bound by the natural law to worship God, and in the way He wills. If this be conceded, it should not be necessary to pursue any further the significance of such papal utterances for the various points discussed in the previous section of this paper.
III.
Intimately connected with the debate about “religion of the state” and about the matter of “consequences” flowing therefrom, is the question whether the government of a state can be said to have the right and duty of suppressing heresy. By suppressing or repressing heresy is not meant the “extermination” of heretics, or the application of force or pressure to make the heterodox give up their convictions. The question has rather to do with the inhibiting of heretical propaganda, legal restrictions placed upon the public circulation of heretical doctrines. It is Fr. Murray’s oft-expressed contention that, in thesi, a government has no right or duty thus to repress heresy.61 Correlatively, the Church would not have the right, in thesi, to call upon the government to do so. This position of his is another of the substantial modifications which Fr. Murray believes should be made in the “old thesis.” And here, again, I am not sure that he has proved his case. In a paper already grown too long, it is not possible to discuss whether Fr. Murray has successfully explained away various papal pronouncements of an earlier day, which are advanced as arguments against his position. It seems enough to follow the simpler course already adopted in the previous sections—of asking whether Fr. Murray has considered all the adverse arguments.
Namely, it seems to me that one must ponder the implications, in the present matter, of Canon 1381, section 3, in the Code of Canon Law.62 The latter, of course, is an authoritative expression of the mind of the contemporary Church on what she considers to be her rights. Now, the Canon in question asserts that the religious instruction of (Catholic) youth in all schools whatsoever (public, therefore, as well as Catholic), is subject to the authority of and supervision by the Church (section 1); that the local Ordinaries have the right and duty of vigilance over all schools in their territory, lest anything be taught or done in these schools contrary to faith or morals (section 2); that the same Ordinaries have the right to approve the teachers and text-books of religion, and to demand, in the interests of religion and morality, that teachers and text-books be removed (section 3).
As I see it, Canon 1381, section 3, amounts to the assertion by the Church of her right to call upon the civil authorities, who control the public schools, to inhibit the spread of heresy. Moreover, the Church has called upon various states to acknowledge this her right, as could readily be shown from various modern Concordats. Now, since the Church may neither demand nor claim the right to demand, that civil authority do something illicit, it should follow that civil authority, the government of a state, has, even in thesi, the right, and, when called upon to exercise it, the duty of “repressing heresy.”
That said, I conclude this attempt to indicate some of the reasons why I have found it difficult to subscribe to Fr. Murray’s views. I have, of course, too great respect for the complexities of the problem, “What is the veritable ‘Catholic thesis’?” and too great a respect for Fr. Murray’s superior grasp of those complexities, to suppose that the difficulties I have suggested are altogether incapable of solution. But, meanwhile, they remain very real difficulties for me, and they move me to say that a recent description of the “old thesis” as “somewhat obsolescent”63 is somewhat premature.
GEORGE W. SHEA
Immaculate Conception Seminary Darlington, N. J.
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Joseph Komonchak, Catholic Principle and the American Experiment: The Silencing of John Courtney Murray, (1999), pg. 4.
Ibid., pg. 12.
Roberto Di Mattei, The Second Vatican Council: An Unwritten Story, (2012), pgs. 362-71.
Pope Leo XIII, Libertas Praestantissimum, (1888), no. 21.
Komonchak, pg. 3.
Pope Leo XIII, Testem Benevolentiae Nostrae, (1899), para. 33.
Michael Davies, The Second Vatican Council and Religious Liberty, (1999), pg. 101.
Mattei, pg. 365; Cf. The Oxford Handbook of Vatican II, “Religious Liberty at Vatican II”, pgs. 267-281.
Mattei, pgs. 210-13.
Mattei, pgs. 187-202, 243-246, 299-304.
Peter Seewald, Benedict XVI, (2020), vol. I, pgs. 300, 405.
Fr. Joseph Thomas, ‘Dignitatis Humanae’ at 60: Vatican II’s Decisive Stand for Religious Freedom, (2025).
The Documents of Vatican II With Notes and Comments by Catholic, Protestant, and Orthodox Authorities, (1966), pgs. 673-4.
Cf. ARTICLE no. 124 of the 1936 Soviet Constitution “In order to ensure to citizens freedom of conscience, the church in the U.S.S.R. is separated from the state, and the school from the church. Freedom of religious worship and freedom of anti-religious propaganda is recognized for all citizens.”
Pope Pius XI, Quas Primas, (1925), no. 32.
John Paul II, Message for the Celebration of the World Day of Peace, (1988).
Pope Leo XIII, Immortale Dei, (1885), no. 36.
Benedict XVI, Ecclesia in Medio Oriente, (2012), no. 27.
Cf. Fr. Felix Sardà y Salvany, Liberalism is a Sin, (1886).
Cf. Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange, De Revalatione, (1926), pgs. 593-603.
Cd. Ottaviani, Duties of the Catholic State In Regard to Religion, (1953), pt. IV; incidentally, in the same treatment, Cd. Ottaviani summarized the arguments of the proponent, however choosing not to name Fr. Murray, of what he called “the liberalizing thesis”:
That the state properly speaking cannot perform an act of religion. (For him the state is a simple symbol or an ensemble of institutions).
That “an immediate illation from the order of ethical and theological truth to the order of constitutional law, is, in principle, inadmissible.” With this axiomatic language he wants to maintain that the State’s obligation to worship God could never enter the constitutional sphere.
Finally, that even for a state composed of Catholics there is no obligation to profess the Catholic religion: as far as the obligation to protect it is concerned, this does not become operative except in determined circumstances, and precisely when the liberty of the Church cannot be otherwise guaranteed.
The learned Cardinal concluded by noting that these principles produce “attacks directed against the teaching set forth in manuals of Public Ecclesiastical Law,” which, he said, “is for the most part based on the doctrine set forth in pontifical documents.”
Pope Pius XII, Humani Generis, (1951), no. 18 — “[T]his sacred Office of Teacher in matters of faith and morals must be the proximate and universal criterion of truth for all theologians, since to it has been entrusted by Christ Our Lord the whole deposit of faith — Sacred Scripture and divine Tradition — to be preserved, guarded and interpreted, still the duty that is incumbent on the faithful to flee also those errors which more or less approach heresy, and accordingly ‘to keep also the constitutions and decrees by which such evil opinions are proscribed and forbidden by the Holy See…’”
Fr. Joseph Clifford Fenton, The American Ecclesiastical Review, (1951), vol. 124, pgs. 451-8.
Cf. the new edition of J. M. Hervé, Manuale Theologiae Dogmaticae, (Paris: Berche et Pagis, 1949), I, 520-35; P. Parente, Theologia Fundamentalis (Turin: Marietti, 1946), pp. 172-77; R. Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., De Revelatione, ed. 4 (Rome: Libreria Editrice Religiosa F. Ferrari, 1945), II, 411-25; A. Vellico, O.F.M., De Ecclesia Christi (Rome: Editiones Comm. A. Arnodo, 1940), pp. 605-39; L. Lercher, S.J., Institutiones Theologicae Dogmaticae, ed. 3, cur. F. Schlagenhaufen, S.J. (Innsbruck: F. Rauch, 1939), I, 244-45, 251; N. Jung, Le Droit public de l’Eglise (Paris: Procure Générale du Clergé, 1948), pp. 109-37; A. Ottaviani, Institutiones Iuris Publici Ecclesiastici, ed. (Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1948), II, 46-252; L. Bender, O.P., Ius Publicum Ecclesiasticum (Bussum: P. Brand, 1948), pp. 169-200; F. Marchesi, S.J., Summula Iuris Publici Ecclesiastici (Naples: M. D’Auria, 1948), pp. 114-130.
Fr. Murray’s major contributions to the subject are: “Governmental Repression of Heresy,” Proceedings of the Catholic Theological Society of America, Third Annual Meeting (Chicago, June 28-30, 1949), pp. 26-98; “St. Robert Bellarmine on the Indirect Power,” Theological Studies, IX (1948), 491-535; “Contemporary Orientations of Catholic Thought on Church and State in the Light of History,” Theological Studies, X (1949), 177-234; “Current Theology on Religious Freedom,” Theological Studies, X (1949), 409-32.
Cf. Murray, Theological Studies, X (1949), 183 f., 227-234, 422-432.
Ibid., 424.
Ibid., 229; cf. 430.
Ibid., 183, 229 f., 233, 422 f., 425 f., 430.
Ibid., pp. 425 f.
Ibid., 189 f., 223-26, 233 f.
Lay; not laicist, laicizing, secularist. Cf. Murray, “Governmental Re-pression of Heresy,” pp. 30, 63; idem, Theological Studies, X (1949), 188-90, 200, 225 f., 232.
Cf. “Governmental Repression of Heresy,” p. 80, and, for an extended discussion of how this reckoning would work out, see the whole section, pp. 70-85.
Ibid., pp. 89-90; cf. Theological Studies, X (1949), 424.
Cf. Murray, “Freedom of Religion: I. The Ethical Problem,” Theological Studies, VI (1945), 268; idem, Theological Studies, X (1949), 423.
Cf. Theological Studies, VI (1945), 268, and “Governmental Repression of Heresy,” pp. 89 f.
Cf. Theological Studies, X (1949), 234, 424, and “Governmental Repression of Heresy.” p. 84.
Cf. Theological Studies. X (1949), 181-83, 231, 233 f.
Ibid., 182 f.
“Freedom of Religion: I. The Ethical Problem,” Theological Studies, VI (1945), 266, with note 9b.
Cf. V. Cathrein, S.J., Philosophia Moralis, ed. 17, cur. J. Schuster, S.J. (Freiburg i. Br.: Herder, 1935), pp. 432-434, 438 f.; J. Donat, S.J., Ethica Specialis, ed. 5 (Innsbruck: F. Rauch), pp. 236 f., 256 f.; E. Cahill, S.J., Framework of the Christian State (Dublin: Gill and Son, 1932), pp. 466 f., 601, 607; Ryan-Boland, Catholic Principles of Politics (New York: Macmillan, 1940), p. 311; H. Rommen, The State in Catholic Thought (St. Louis: Herder, 1945), pp. 366 f.
Cf. treatises on Moral Theology, Ius Publicum Ecclesiasticum, and Fundamental Theology. In the latter discipline, the teaching is a standard thesis of the tract De Vera Religione, and reappears in the tract De Ecclesia as an argument against separation of Church and state; cf. Lercher, op. cit., 8 f., 244; Hervé, op. cit., 30, 523, 526 f.; Garrigou-Lagrange, op. cit., 411 f.; S. Tromp, S.J., De Revelatione Christiana, ed. 4 (Rome: Gregorian University, 1937), p. 37; J. Herrmann, C.SS.R., Institutiones Theologiae Dogmaticae, ed. 7, cur. Stehler-Raus (Lyons-Paris: E. Vitte, 1937), I, 83, 492; A. Dorsch, S.J., Institutiones Theologiae Fundamentalis, ed. 3 (Innsbruck: F. Rauch, 1930), I, 271-272; L. Billot, S.J., De Ecclesia Christi, ed. 3 (Rome: Gregorian University, 1929), II, 84-86; M. d’Herbigny, S.J., Theologica de Ecclesia, ed. 3 (Paris: G. Beauchesne, 1927), I, 140; G. Lahousse, S.J., De Vera Religione (Louvain: C. Peeters, 1897), pp. 45-48; G. Wilmers, S.J., De Religione Revelata (Regensburg: Pustet, 1897), pp. 26 f.; T. Zigliara, O.P., Propaedeutica ad S. Theologiam, ed. 4 (Rome: Typographia Polyglotta, 1897), pp. 203 f.; C. Mazzella, S.J., De Religione et Ecclesia (Rome: Typographia Polyglotta, 1880), pp. 21, 25 f., 456 f. Cf. also the (Primum) Schema Constitutionis Dogmaticae de Ecclesia drawn up at the Vatican Council: cap. xiii (Collectio Lacensis, VII, 573b), and the theologians’ adnotationes thereto (ibid., 622d, 623d-624a).
Cf. Pius XII, Ency. Mediator Dei, AAS XXXIX (1947), pp. 525 f., 530 f.; English transl., Mediator Dei: On the Sacred Liturgy (New York: Paulist Press), pp. 17 f, 35.
Cf. Dorsch, op. cit., I, 271 f.; Lahousse, op. cit., pp. 45-48; Donat, op. cit., p. 236.
Cf. Dorsch, op. cit., I, 272.
Cf. L. Choupin, S.J., Valeur des décisions doctrinales et disciplinaires du Saint-Siège, ed. 3 (Paris: G. Beauchesne, 1928), p. 272; Garrigou-Lagrange, op. cit., II, 420, rsp. ad obj. 1. Cf. also Rommen, op. cit., p. 367.
Leo XIII, Ency. Immortale Dei: “The Church is wont to take earnest heed that no one shall be forced to embrace the Catholic faith against his will, for, as St. Augustine wisely reminds us, ‘Man cannot believe otherwise than of his own free will.’” The passage is found in the Codicis iuri scanonici fontes (hereinafter designated by CICF), cura Emi Petri Card. Gasparri editi (Romae: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1926-39), III, 245 f.; and in DB, 1875; Engl. transl., The Great Encyclical Letters of Pope Leo XIII (New York: Benziger Brothers, 1903), p. 127.—Cf. also the Code of Canon Law, can. 752, 1; can. 1351. Also, Pius XII, Ency. Mystici Corporis Christi, June 29, 1943, in AAS XXXV (1943), 243; Eng. transl., The Mystical Body of Christ (New York: The America Press), nn. 122 f. See also Pius XII, Allocution to the Roman Rota, Oct. 6, 1946; AAS XXXVIII (1946), 393 f.; Engl. transl. in T. Bouscaren, S.J., Canon Law Digest, Supplement 1948 (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1949), pp. 255-257.
See, for example, Ottaviani, op. cit., II, 51-57.
Theological Studies, X (1949), 227.
Cf. AAS XXI (1929), 301; J. Lo Grasso, S.J., Ecclesia et Status (Rome: Gregorian University, 1939), nn. 831 f; America, June 15, 1929, pp. 219-220.
Theological Studies, X (1949), 229; italics mine.
Ibid., 183; italics mine.
Ibid., 229.
Ibid., 231-33.
CICF, III, 229; The Great Encyclical Letters of Pope Leo XIII, pp. 97 f.
CICF, III, 236 f.; The Great Encyclical Letters . . ., pp. 110 f.
CICF, III, 242; The Great Encyclical Letters . . ., p. 121.
CICF, III, 304; The Great Encyclical Letters . . ., pp. 150 f.
CICF, III, 662.
See, for example, Fr. Murray’s “Governmental Repression of Heresy,” e. g., p. 27
C.I.C., can. 1381:
Religiosa iuventutis institutio in scholis quibuslibet auctoritati et inspectioni Ecclesiae subicitur.
Ordinariis locorum ius et officium est vigilandi ne in quibusvis scholis sui territorii quidquam contra fidem vel bonos mores tradatur aut fiat.
Eisdem similiter ius est approbandi religionis magistros et libros; itemque, religionis morumque causa, exigendi ut tum magistri tum libri removeantur.
Cf. the review of Hervé, op. cit., by Sheedy, C.S.C., in Speculum.