The doctrine of 'liberty of conscience', its principles and effects — Zigliara, 1910
The learned cardinal accurately characterizes, diagnoses and refutes the poisonous doctrine, which is among the chief causes of the sickness plaguing modern American life
“In order to have the exercise of true freedom, it is necessary that no duty be derogated from: for freedom is not for evil but for good (Ps. 50, XIV).”
Born in late October of 1833, Tommaso Maria Cardinal Zigliara, O.P., (pictured above) was a member of seven Roman congregations, prefect of the Congregation of Studies and co-president of the Academy of St. Thomas Aquinas. Under the direction of Pope Leo XIII, he was a principal agent for promoting the revival of scholastic philosophy throughout the entire Catholic Church. Cd. Zigliara passed away in Rome on the 11th of May, 1893.
ARTICLE TWO — Thesis (65)
On the Liberty of Conscience.
I. The notion of freedom of conscience. Today, all who profess liberalism proclaim the necessity of freedom of conscience; and not a few Catholics from the liberal school, as they say, who therefore call themselves liberal Catholics, agree with the liberal rationalists in this matter. But what is freedom of conscience? Generally speaking, according to its advocates, it can be said to be the faculties of thinking and acting which they most like in what pertains to God and religion. We therefore ask whether man enjoys this right, or this freedom of conscience: and note the words of the question, for we ask about the right.
II. First presentation. In advance, I state that no faith can be imposed on an unbeliever by force, which he himself refuses to admit, because believing is a matter of the will, as St. Thomas says.1 Whence the Council of Toledo commanded this: “But concerning the Jews the holy Synod commanded that henceforth no one should be forced to believe; for God has mercy on whom He wills, and hardens whom He wills.”2 Whence they truly slander the Catholic Church, who say that it uses violence against consciences to spread the faith of Christ. Of course violence existed and exists, but the Church has suffered and suffers it, it does not deceive, as the history of martyrs and persecutions clearly testifies.
III. Another presentation. In order to have the exercise of true freedom, it is necessary that no duty be derogated from: for freedom is not for evil but for good.3 Therefore, whenever a man abuses it for evil, it should not be called freedom but more truly license. Therefore, to ask whether freedom of conscience is permissible is the same as to ask whether the freedom of thinking and acting in those things which are more pleasing to God and religion derogates from duties towards God himself. This is precisely the meaning of the question, and it must be solved under this aspect, and its solution is easy.
IV. Third presentation. But the question proposed in this way can be defined 1° absolutely, or considered with regard to freedom of conscience in itself; 2° relatively, or considered with regard to freedom of conscience with regard to civil coexistence: under which aspect it is chiefly defended by its adversaries. — Let therefore be the first conclusion.
V. Freedom of conscience, considered in itself, is altogether impious. For man is bound by the strictest duty of nature to think rightly of God, and of those things which concern both speculative and practical religion.4 But to voluntarily contradict the strictest duty of nature is license, not liberty; and if we are talking, as in our argument, of a voluntary transgression of duty towards God, the aforesaid license is impiety. Therefore, because through freedom of conscience the right is given to man to think of God as he pleases, this liberty is true impiety. — But since this first conclusion is strongly disputed by the adversaries, let what has been said suffice for its proof; and I come to the second part of the question. Let the second conclusion therefore be.
VI. Freedom of conscience considered socially, if it can be tolerated in given circumstances, should never be approved, much less protected or inculcated. That it can be tolerated in given cases is easily admitted: for many other evils are tolerated, or not punished (for to tolerate is not to approve nor simply to condone, but only to not punish), indeed sometimes they must be tolerated in society, because otherwise worse evils would follow. But this tolerance must not be approval, not protection, not inculcation. — Probable thesis — Freedom of conscience considered socially is based on nothing else than political atheism, is most destructive to society, is self-contradictory. Therefore freedom of conscience considered socially can in no way be approved. The antecedent is proved.
It is founded solely on political atheism. For, as was said in the preceding number, freedom of conscience is the right granted to individuals to think about God as they please, or to submit those things which are of God and religion, and the duties consequent thereon, to the definition and judgment of individual conscience, which is therefore constituted as the criterion of religion. But just as in many other things man errs not only from ignorance but also from malice, so also in those things which are of religion; nay, in these more than in others, because religion carries more severe duties, to which depraved passions are reluctant: which errors, both speculative and practical, in the religious order constitute impiety. But because, as was said, in freedom of conscience the criterion is individual reason itself, the right of freedom of conscience is truly the right to error and impiety: which right cannot indeed be approved in society and association, unless religious skepticism or political atheism is also present.
It is most pernicious to society. For as long as actions remain in the conscience, they are proper to the individual, and fall only under the judgment of God. But by the very fact that they are manifested, they have a relation to the members of society, and consequently, when they inflict harm on the members of society, they fall under the purview of social authority. But just as men suffer scandal or any other harm from the impiety of other men, so a fortiori they suffer scandal and harm from the public and unpunished, and much more from the permitted and approved dissemination of error and impiety, by which the intellectual and moral perfection of men is directly hindered. Therefore, to not prevent these scandals, these harms more serious than bodily harm, but to approve them, is not only impiety towards God, but is a perversion of the social order itself.
It is self-contradictory. And in reality, either freedom of conscience is a right, or it is not. If it is not, why is it proclaimed? But if it is, why is it limited? The contradiction of the defenders of freedom of conscience lies precisely in the limitation. Indeed, they not only prescribe religion, but also violently impose it with respect to civil laws, with respect to the King, etc. But neither civil laws, nor the king, nor society itself are above God, if he is removed, all else collapses, and all morality is either absurdity or a brute force of the stronger.5 Therefore, if freedom of conscience is a right with respect to religious duties towards God, and political authority is scrupulous in observing that right, political authority itself cannot, without manifest contradiction and without open violence, prevent that right from being fully exercised with respect to royal power, with respect to civil laws, and finally with respect to society itself. — But if it is said that freedom of conscience is therefore to be restrained, lest duties towards society be harmed; I conclude, therefore it is not freedom, but license of conscience, that is to be restrained much more lest duties towards God, which are greater than social duties, be harmed, so that these are not given nor can be given without them.6
VII. Corollaries. The following propositions, therefore, were deservedly condemned in the Syllabus of Pius IX, which affirm both freedom of conscience and indifferentism:
“Every man is free to embrace and profess that religion which, guided by the light of reason, he shall consider true.”7
“Man may, in the observance of any religion whatever, find the way of eternal salvation, and arrive at eternal salvation.”8
VIII. Note. The difficulty is solved. What modern liberals teach about freedom of conscience in the social order is not new, but Rousseau had already handed it down in his Social Contract.9 Let us therefore listen to this sophist, so that from his lips we may learn the arguments of the others: “Subjects,” he says, “are not bound to render an account to the authorities of their own opinions, except in so far as these are referred to the community. But it is indeed in the interest of the State that every citizen profess a religion which instills in him a love of his duties; but the dogmas of this religion do not concern the State or its members, except in so far as they are referred to morality and to the duties which the citizen is bound to fulfill towards others.”
That these were written by Rousseau in hatred of the Catholic Church is evident from what he arbitrarily invents in the cited chapter. Hence the contradictions and absurdities which we find everywhere in the words of himself and his imitators. — Beyond doubt, as long as religion is enclosed in the inner conscience, it is hidden from both civil and ecclesiastical authorities; and consequently God alone is the judge of it. But when religion becomes a rule of morals, it is by that very fact referred to the community. In this sense Rousseau admits that the State is concerned that each citizen profess that religion which instills in him a love of his duties. But only true religion instills in citizens a love of his duties. Therefore, contrary to what Rousseau illogically concludes, it must be said, even from its principles, that the State not only does not belong to it, but it also has the most serious duty to do what is in it, so that the true religion is observed at least externally by all citizens, and the propagators of irreligion or false dogmas are restrained. — All of which is so true that Rousseau himself, who defends freedom or license of conscience against the Catholic Church, immediately after the quoted words utterly destroys it by establishing the omnipotence of the State and Statolatry: “Therefore, we must welcome,” he says, “a purely civil profession of faith, the articles of which it is the right of the Prince to determine, not as dogmas of religion, but as far as the feelings of sociability (sentiments), without which it is impossible for a man to be a good citizen and a faithful subject. A certain prince has no power to impose faith in such articles, but he can nevertheless expel from the state anyone who does not believe them, not as impious, but as unsociable and incapable of sincerely loving the law and justice, and of sacrificing, if necessary, his life for the fulfillment of his duty. But if anyone, after having publicly admitted the aforesaid dogmas, leads his life as if he did not believe them; he is punished with death: for he has committed the greatest crime, because he lied before the law: let him be punished with death: he has committed the greatest of crimes, lying before the law.” Thus speaks Rousseau, thus speak those who follow his sophism. They begin from the beginning: the Prince has nothing to do with the religious opinions of his subjects, provided that their external lives conform to their social duties, but rather a code of religion must be drawn up by the Prince, which must include positive dogmas, namely the existence of God, the future life, the rewards of the good and the punishments of the evil, and negative dogmas which Rousseau reduces to intolerance alone.10 Finally, it is concluded that citizens should not be tolerated, and should either be expelled from the State or punished with death, who do not hold this civil religion, even if they observe everything else that pertains to duties towards others. This is, by liberty of conscience, true religion is conscientiously excluded from the State, as if the principles of true religion should in fact be of no concern to the State; by reason of sociality; religion itself is submitted to the will of the Prince; and citizens must blindly obey the will of the Prince in admitting religion, under pain of exile or death! — Nor could it be concluded otherwise. For freedom of conscience, if once admitted, is opposed to true religion, just as it is opposed to true happiness of the State; because there is no morality without God, no duty without religion. But if the order in things that respect religion is withdrawn from the Church of God, it must necessarily be handed over to the will of the civil power: which, lacking authority in religion, imposes its own tyranny on consciences; and thus the true liberty of souls is oppressed by means of the same principles with which the false liberty of conscience is proclaimed by Rousseau and his followers.11
END.12
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ST II-II, q. X, a. VIII
Cf. Franciscus Victoria, Relect. V. de Indis, §. XV
Ps. 50, XIV
(33, II), Zigliara. Summa philos. — T. III.
(29, II)
(32, IV)
(Prop. XV)
(Prop. XVI)
Book IV, Chapter VIII
(ibid.)
Cf. Principes du Droit politique mis en opposition avec le Contrat social de J-J. Rousseau, par Honoré Torombert, etc., Lib. IV, par M. Lanjuinais, p. 335 (Paris, 1825).
The translation for this document was done with digital translation software and then manually reviewed to ensure readability and coherence. The emphases, punctuation and style are as faithful to the original text as possible, reason permitting. The skeptical reader is encouraged to review the original Latin, sense and style of the text, linked above, should he maintain doubts.