Vatican II's Dignitatis Humanæ, substantial continuity or rupture?
A deductive analysis of the conciliar decree in relation to Pope Pius IX's Quanta Cura, and whether the opposition is merely apparent, or real
“The thesis I found hardest to live with was the one on religious freedom. For years I had taught the public law theses of Cardinal [Alfredo] Ottaviani, according to which only the truth [as held by the Roman Catholic Church] had rights. In the end, I convinced myself we had been wrong.” - John Paul I, Current Biography, pg. 208
Introduction
Some readers, perhaps, may bristle at the question in the title, even going so far as to dismiss it. If this this your inclination, we would encourage you to keep reading. Agree or disagree, what follows is among the most potent arguments for rupture between Catholic tradition and the conciliar teaching. Assuming, arguendo, continuity could be proved, importantly according to sound methodology, this argument of rupture would need to be sufficiently answered, and then refuted. In any case, the author of the critical analysis is Fr. Hervé Belmont. With his gracious permission, we are happy to present his arguments in English, where they will hopefully reach a wide Catholic audience. A sincere and intellectually curious audience, that desires to pursue and embrace Truth above all else, whatever the consequences. For background, Fr. Belmont is a French priest known for his commitment to preserving and teaching the traditional Catholic faith. Based in Saint-Maixant, he was ordained by the founder of the Society of Saint Pius X, Archbishop Marcel Lefebrvre. On the question of the present state of the Catholic Church, Fr. Belmont adheres to The Thesis of Cassiciacum,1 developed by the late Dominican theologian, M.L. Guérard des Lauriers.2 Fr. Belmont’s writings cover many subjects—theology, philosophy, history and spirituality—and can be found at his website Quicumque. Readers are encouraged to visit, as the site is a wealth of information.
What follows is a translated essay making, what can be termed, the deductive argument3 for rupture between Catholic teaching on the question of religious liberty (equivalent to unrestricted freedom of worship and conscience in the external and public forum) in relation to the 1965 conciliar declaration, Dignitatis Humanæ, on the same question. Until the Second Vatican Council, the Catholic Church had been far from silent on the evil of religious liberty, now commonly referred to as religious freedom, and an attendant ‘right’ to it. Branded as a “never sufficiently to be deplored heresy” by Pope Pius VII in 1814,4 and an “absurd and erroneous proposition” by Pope Gregory XVI in 1832,5 the notion of religious freedom is not only repugnant to mere reason (who would suggest that, in religious and moral matters, truth and falsehood ought to be equated before the State, even having the same rights) but had already received condemnation by the supreme authority of the Church. The aforementioned, des Lauriers, keenly observed that Dignitatis Humanæ “deals with a doctrine received and defined by Tradition, and solemnly recapitulated by Pius IX in the Syllabus and in the Encyclical Quanta Cura.” This latter text, promulgated in December of 1864, will be the specific focus of Fr. Belmont’s analysis.
A related question, the idea of tolerance of a false religion by the State will be outside the scope of this treatment. It suffices to say that the traditional doctrine presupposes an evil to be avoided, namely freedom for dissident cults and sects in the public and civil order, which can only be justified for a grave and proportionate reason: either to prevent a greater evil, or to secure some greater good.6 Depending on the circumstances, there may even be a positive duty of the State to repress false religions, punishing individual and corporate violators of the Catholic religion and morals, alike. In these circumstances, this duty, if shirked, would constitute sin on the part of the State.7 Nevertheless, the traditional doctrine of toleration does not equal the approval of false religions—much less sanctioning them and giving them rights—only choosing not to punish or repress the evil. Those familiar with Catholic philosophy understand that rights, in this context, are always specified by their object: which must be objective truth and goodness. Rights, after all, are defined as moral powers of acquiring something, owed in justice, and given by either natural or positive law.8 Pope Leo XIII confirmed this, teaching, “For right is a moral power which… it is absurd to suppose that nature has accorded indifferently to truth and falsehood, to justice and injustice. Men have a right freely and prudently to propagate throughout the State what things soever are true and honorable… but lying opinions, than which no mental plague is greater, and vices which corrupt the heart and moral life should be diligently repressed by public authority, lest they insidiously work the ruin of the State.”9 An error, such as the public profession or worship of a false religion, crucially as Pope Pius XII said, has no objective “right to exist, to be spread or to be activated.”10 The subjective disposition of the exponent, the erring man, has no bearing on the objective public order and whether he has a right to spread his religious errors and offer public worship, even if he is in good faith.
At the risk of belaboring the point, any reader looking to verify the above or seek a further explanation of religious liberty, its definition and scope, how and why it was condemned, along with the related—though distinct—question of religious tolerance, is encouraged to read the following treatments from approved, Catholic theologians:
On ‘freedom of worship’, its principles and effects — Zigliara, O.P., (1910)
On ‘liberty of conscience’, its principles and effects — Zigliara, O.P., (1910)
On political tolerance of false religion — Straub, S.J., (1912)
On religious tolerance — Dorsch, S.J., (1928)
Catholic doctrine on Church and State — Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., (1950)
Note on Sound and Unsound Interpretation
Let us make a final observation before introducing the critique. Almost incredibly, the propositions committed to in the conciliar decree by Paul VI nearly word-for-word admit a set of ideas that were explicitly condemned by Pope Pius IX in Quanta Cura. In our view, Fr. Belmont will clearly demonstrate this below—not merely asserting it. As honest defenders of Dignitatis Humanæ recognize, at least prima facie, the texts are in stark contradiction. It is for this reason that its apologists, particularly the learned, invariably have recourse to unapproved and alternative explanations to try and reconcile the text to Catholic teaching. These attempts are often called hermeneutics of continuity or hermeneutics of charity. However, defenses of this kind do not work. Why? In fact, the official doctrinal interpretation, implementation and development of religious freedom by the conciliar hierarchy—of which there is considerable data—is ultimately, and exclusively, the authentic standard by which Dignitatis Humanæ is to be understood. This is the essential reason that sound methodology was alluded to previously, for those looking to reconcile the teachings. How could law possibly and reasonably be understood divorced, even against, the mind of the legislator and his authority? How could a student, he who is taught, interpret the words of his professor, he who teaches, against the latter’s mind and later explanations? Consider the absurdity of reading the Council of Trent against the implementation of Pope St. Pius V, or not seeing the direct link between Pope Leo XIII’s Libertas and his earlier encyclical on Church-State relations, Immortale Dei. In the case of Dignitatis Humanæ, we must look to the mind of the council and the subsequent interpretation and implementation of John Paul II - Francis I, continuing now with Leo XIV. Common sense aside, and to avoid being accused of any kind of prejudice, traditionalist or otherwise, on this methodological point, it is worth recalling that the conciliar hierarchy admits the same, elementary rule of interpretation. Francis I, as recently as 2021 has made this point, perhaps in exasperation, saying “This is magisterium: the Council is the magisterium of the Church. Either you are with the Church and therefore you follow the Council, and if you do not follow the Council or you interpret it in your own way, as you wish, you are not with the Church. We must be demanding and strict on this point [emphasis added].”11
Therefore, given this methodological reality, recourse to unapproved, private interpretations has neither value nor binding power.12 This is particularly true in the face of a markedly different understanding by the conciliar authority. A simple comparison to make this point will suffice, noting that we have bolded some of the text for emphasis:
Pope Gregory XVI, in his 1832 encyclical letter condemning liberalism and religious indifferentism, Mirari Vos, warned against the following ideas:
No. 14 - This shameful font of indifferentism gives rise to that absurd and erroneous proposition which claims that liberty of conscience must be maintained for everyone. It spreads ruin in sacred and civil affairs, though some repeat over and over again with the greatest impudence that some advantage accrues to religion from it. “But the death of the soul is worse than freedom of error,” as Augustine was wont to say. When all restraints are removed by which men are kept on the narrow path of truth, their nature, which is already inclined to evil, propels them to ruin. Then truly “the bottomless pit” is open from which John saw smoke ascending which obscured the sun, and out of which locusts flew forth to devastate the earth. Thence comes transformation of minds, corruption of youths, contempt of sacred things and holy laws — in other words, a pestilence more deadly to the state than any other. Experience shows, even from earliest times, that cities renowned for wealth, dominion, and glory perished as a result of this single evil, namely immoderate freedom of opinion, license of free speech, and desire for novelty.
Pope Pius IX in the Syllabus of 1864 authoritatively and explicitly condemns the following false social principles, considered in themselves:
Prop. 15 - Every man is free to embrace and profess that religion which, guided by the light of reason, he shall consider true.
Prop. 77 - In the present day it is no longer expedient that the Catholic religion should be held as the only religion of the State, to the exclusion of all other forms of worship.
Prop. 78 - Hence it has been wisely decided by law, in some Catholic countries, that persons coming to reside therein shall enjoy the public exercise of their own peculiar worship.
Prop. 79 - Moreover, it is false that the civil liberty of every form of worship, and the full power, given to all, of overtly and publicly manifesting any opinions whatsoever and thoughts, conduce more easily to corrupt the morals and minds of the people, and to propagate the pest of indifferentism.
Prop. 80 - The Roman Pontiff can, and ought to, reconcile himself, and come to terms with progress, liberalism and modern civilization.
Now, examine the official teaching of John Paul II, in his 1979 encyclical letter Redemptor Hominis:
No. 17 - These rights are rightly reckoned to include the right to religious freedom together with the right to freedom of conscience. The Second Vatican Council considered especially necessary the preparation of a fairly long declaration on this subject. This is the document called Dignitatis Humanæ, in which is expressed not only the theological concept of the question but also the concept reached from the point of view of natural law, that is to say from the ‘purely human’ position, on the basis of the premises given by man’s own experience, his reason and his sense of human dignity. Certainly the curtailment of the religious freedom of individuals and communities is not only a painful experience but it is above all an attack on man’s very dignity, independently of the religion professed or of the concept of the world which these individuals and communities have. The curtailment and violation of religious freedom are in contrast with man’s dignity and his objective rights.
His public speeches, on the World Day of Peace in 1988 and to the Diplomatic Corps in 1990 witness to the same, respectively:
No. 1 - The State cannot claim authority, direct or indirect, over a person’s religious convictions. It cannot arrogate to itself the right to impose or to impede the profession or public practice of religion by a person or a community. In this matter, it is the duty of civil authorities to ensure that the rights of individuals and communities are equally respected, and at the same time it is their duty to safeguard proper public order.
Even in cases where the State grants a special juridical position to a particular religion, there is a duty to ensure that the right to freedom of conscience is legally recognized and effectively respected for all citizens, and also for foreigners living in the country even temporarily for reasons of employment and the like.
No. 16 - I am convinced that the great traditions of Islam, such as welcoming strangers, fidelity in friendship, patience in the face of adversity, the importance given to faith in God, are the principles which ought to enable unacceptable sectarian attitudes to be overcome. I express my earnest hope that if Muslim believers nowadays rightly find in countries of Christian tradition the facilities needed for satisfying the demands of their religion, then Christians will similarly be able to benefit from a comparable treatment in all countries of Islamic tradition. Religious freedom cannot be limited to simple tolerance. It is a civil and social reality, matched by specific rights enabling believers and their communities to witness without fear to their faith in God and to live out all the demands of that faith.
Further, compare with Benedict XVI, in his 2012 Post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortation, Ecclesia in Medio Oriente, where he championed the following ideas:
Para. 26 - Religious freedom is the pinnacle of all other freedoms. It is a sacred and inalienable right. It includes on the individual and collective levels the freedom to follow one’s conscience in religious matters and, at the same time, freedom of worship. It includes the freedom to choose the religion which one judges to be true and to manifest one’s beliefs in public. [citation for Dignitatis Humanæ nos. 6-8, along with other conciliar documents]. It must be possible to profess and freely manifest one’s religion and its symbols without endangering one’s life and personal freedom. Religious freedom is rooted in the dignity of the person; it safeguards moral freedom and fosters mutual respect.
Finally, juxtapose Gregory XVI and Pius IX with the consistent conciliar understanding of Francis I in his 2013 Apostolic Exhortation, Evangelii Gaudium, his 2014 Meeting with Leaders of other Religions and Christian Denominations and a 2024 speech to Participants in the Dialogue Promoted by the Dicastery for Interreligious Dialogue, respectively:
No. 255 - The Synod Fathers spoke of the importance of respect for religious freedom, viewed as a fundamental human right. This includes ‘the freedom to choose the religion which one judges to be true and to manifest one’s beliefs in public’. [citation for Ecclesia in Medio Oriente]. A healthy pluralism, one which genuinely respects differences and values them as such, does not entail privatizing religions in an attempt to reduce them to the quiet obscurity of the individual’s conscience or to relegate them to the enclosed precincts of churches, synagogues or mosques. This would represent, in effect, a new form of discrimination and authoritarianism. The respect due to the agnostic or non-believing minority should not be arbitrarily imposed in a way that silences the convictions of the believing majority or ignores the wealth of religious traditions.”
Para. 5 - [John Paul II] immediately then added, “True religious freedom shuns the temptation to intolerance and sectarianism, and promotes attitudes of respect and constructive dialogue” (Message to the Albanian People, 25 April 1993). We cannot deny that intolerance towards those with different religious convictions is a particularly insidious enemy, one which today is being witnessed in various areas around the world. All believers must be particularly vigilant so that, in living out with conviction our religious and ethical code, we may always express the mystery we intend to honour. This means that all those forms which present a distorted use of religion, must be firmly refuted as false since they are unworthy of God or humanity. Authentic religion is a source of peace and not of violence! No one must use the name of God to commit violence! To kill in the name of God is a grave sacrilege. To discriminate in the name of God is inhuman.
Para. 8 - In this quest, we must never tire of speaking and working for the dignity and rights of every person, every community and every people. We must always defend their rights. Indeed, freedom of conscience and religion is the cornerstone of the entire edifice of human rights. Nor is freedom of religion limited to the expression of worship; it also entails complete freedom in the matter of one’s own beliefs and religious practice (cf. Second Vatican Ecumenical Council, Declaration Dignitatis Humanæ, 3-4).
More proofs could be added but in the interest of time, this will be adequate. These quotes are verbatim and taken from public and official texts. The skeptical reader is encouraged to verify them if he has doubts. Further reinforcing this point will be a longer survey, soon to be released at The Journal of American Reform. In this, we hope to further reveal—in a more comprehensive way—the radical contradiction between previous Catholic doctrine and Dignitatis Humanæ, along with its effected reforms. Not only will the survey capture the teaching and official statements of the conciliar hierarchy, but it will add two more valuable sets of data: the first set, actions of the conciliar hierarchy in the practical order, notably their active encouragement and suppression of the formerly (Catholic) confessional states, and the second, the witness of approved conciliar prelates and theologians to doctrinal rupture.
Now, without further ado, we present the arguments of Fr. Hervé Belmont on the opposition by contradiction between Dignitatis Humanæ and Quanta Cura, and its theological implications and consequences.
Vatican II's opposition to previous Catholic doctrine and its theological implications and consequences — Fr. Hervé Belmont
Overview
I. The opposition of Vatican II and the previous doctrine on religious freedom.
II. The theological consequences of this opposition.
III. The theological consequences of religious freedom.
I.
The most obvious opposition between the teaching of Vatican II and the doctrine previously taught by the Catholic Church concerns religious freedom. More precisely, it concerns the existence of a right to religious freedom in the external and public forum, the existence of a right to publicly profess the religion of one’s choice.
This is, therefore, civil law in religious matters.
The Roman Catholic religion is the only true religion; by reason of its divine mission, it has an imprescriptible right to civil liberty in everything that pertains to that mission. The point, then, on which there is opposition is the freedom of the public exercise of false religions and false cults.
It is therefore necessary to eliminate what is not in question:
— the freedom of the act of faith;
— the duty to seek religious truth and adhere to it;
— the obligation arising from erroneous conscience;
— the freedom of the Catholic Church;
— the possible duty of the State to tolerate, in certain cases, false cults, to avoid greater evils (a duty that does not in any way establish a correlative right in the subjects).
Nor is it a question, in this first point, of explaining or justifying the teaching of Pius IX; it is simply a question of noting and accepting the condemnations that he fulminates, condemnations of false social principles considered in themselves, independently of their philosophical (rationalism, naturalism) or historical (individualism) context.
It is a question of noting that Dignitatis Humanæ teaches as being a natural right that which Quanta Cura condemns as arising from a principle contrary to divine Revelation: which is strictly impossible.
Finally, before expressing this opposition, I believe it is useful to clarify that it is one thing not to see the connection, continuity or coherence between two teachings, and another thing to see a radical incompatibility between them.
In the first case, if it is a question of teachings that belong to faith, the Credo ut intellegam (I believe in order that I may understand) applies. In the second case, it is impossible for the human intelligence, with the best will in the world, to truly and simultaneously adhere to two contradictory or contrary propositions.
Last clarification: The texts of the Magisterium must be received according to their obvious meaning, which can sometimes be technical or difficult, and not according to meanings “forcing the bar” to make them compatible with others.
If a 300-page work is needed to stretch a text in one direction, stretch another in the opposite direction, and find particular cases to loudly affirm that there is identity, continuity and compatibility, while the first and clear senses refuse to undergo these contortions, then there is a serious problem in which faith (which is exercised by natural intelligence) does not find satisfaction.
To erase the opposition, one cannot, therefore, resort to methods such as:
“— Officer, I called you to file a complaint against my neighbor, who is committing indecent assaults: he never closes the bathroom window!
— I know… but you can’t see that window from your house!
— Yes, you can! Take this ironing board, attach it to one side under the table, and put the other end outside the window. On top of the table, stack ten thick dictionaries to act as a counterweight. On the end of the board that is outside, put this stool, stand on it, lean forward holding on to the gutter and you will notice that you can see that his window is open. You can see that I am right. It is unbearable!”
1. The Texts
a) Quanta Cura, Pope Pius IX, 1864
“And, against the doctrine of Scripture, of the Church, and of the Holy Fathers, they do not hesitate to assert that:
‘the best condition of society is one in which the government is not recognized as having the duty to repress, through legal penalties, violations of Catholic law, except to the extent that public tranquility requires it’. [A]
As a result of this completely false idea of the government of societies, they are not afraid to sustain that erroneous opinion, extremely disastrous for the Catholic Church and the salvation of souls, which Our Predecessor Gregory XVI, of happy memory, called ‘insanity’:
‘Freedom of conscience and worship is a right proper to every man; [B]
this right must be proclaimed and guaranteed by law in every well-organized society.’ [C]”
I call [A], [B] and [C] three condemned propositions. Here is their text in Latin:
[A] Optimam esse conditionem societatis, in qua imperio non agnoscitur officium coercendi sancitis pœnis violatores catholicæ religionis, nisi quatenus pax publica postulet.
[B] Libertatem conscientiæ et cultuum esse proprium cujuscumque hominis jus…
[C] quod lege proclamari et asseri debet in omni recte constituta societate.
Proposition [A] is condemned by itself and declared absolutely (ommino) false: it is not, therefore, because of the naturalism or individualism of those who professed it in 1864 that it is reproved; the same thing as for propositions [B] and [C], qualified as a whole as erroneous opinion.
b) Dignitatis Humanæ, Paul VI, 1965
Here is § 2:
“The Vatican Council declares that the human person has the right to religious freedom [B'].
This freedom consists in the following: all men must be free from all coercion, whether on the part of individuals, of social groups or of any human power whatsoever, in such a way that,
in religious matters, no one shall be forced to act against his conscience, nor hindered from acting, within just limits, in accordance with his conscience, in private and in public, alone or in association with others [A'].
It further declares that the right to religious freedom is based on the very dignity of the human person, as revealed by the Word of God and reason itself.
This right of the human person to religious freedom in the legal order of society must be recognized in such a way that it constitutes a civil right [C'].”
I called [B'], [A'] and [C'] three principles presented as universal, independent of circumstances, as they are founded on the very nature of man under the aspect of dignity.
In proposition [A'], what is at stake is: “prevented from acting… in public…”.
[A'] Ita quidem ut in re religious neque aliquis cogatur ad agendum contra suam conscientiam neque impediatur, quominus juxta suam conscientiam agat privatim et publice, vel solus vel aliis consociatus, intra debitos Limites.
[B'] Haec Vaticana synodus declarat personam humanom jus habere ad libertatem religiousam.
[C'] Hoc jus personæ humanæ ad libertatem religiousam in juridica societatis ordinatione ita est agnoscendum, ut jus civile evadat.
The content of the just limits of [A'] is given in § 7: it concerns the requirements of public peace and morality. This coincides with the public tranquility mentioned by Quanta Cura, but in any case it refers to the application of the law, which is affirmed by itself.
2. The Opposition
On the one hand, the propositions [B] and [C] condemned by Quanta Cura are equivalent to the propositions [B'] and [C'] taught by Dignitatis Humanæ.
On the other hand, the proposition [A] condemned by Quanta Cura is necessarily implied by the proposition [A'] taught by Vatican II: and therefore the condemnation of [A] entails that of [A'].
I recall that this is about religious freedom in the external public forum: is it, yes or no, a natural right? Should this right be legally recognized in civil society?
The link between [A'] and [A] is established as follows:
If in religious matters no one should be prevented from acting in public according to his conscience (within just limits) [A'],
therefore, public authorities should not use legal penalties to repress violators of Catholic law (except to the extent that public peace requires it).
It follows that the condition of society in which the power is not recognized as having the responsibility to repress violators of the Catholic faith through legal penalties (unless...) is better than the condition of society in which the power is recognized as having such a responsibility,
which is equivalent to saying that the best condition of society is one in which the power is not recognized as having the responsibility to repress violators of the Catholic faith through punishment (unless…) [A].
It is quite clear, in fact, that if religious freedom is a natural right, the best condition for society is one in which power is not recognized as having the responsibility to violate this natural right!
Therefore, [A'] necessarily entails [A], and the condemnation of [A] entails that of [A'].
Quanta Cura and Dignitatis Humanæ are radically incompatible.
II.
The contradiction, practically word for word, is therefore proven. Pius IX condemns what Vatican II teaches. The problem is therefore serious, and it becomes even more serious if we consider that we are dealing with two cases of infallibility…
1. Quanta Cura is a pontifical act ex cathedra
It is enough to read the conclusion of the document for this to become evident: “Remembering Our apostolic duty (…) We reprove, proscribe and condemn with Our apostolic authority each and every one of the perverted doctrines and opinions set out in detail in this Our letter; and We want and command that all the children of the Catholic Church consider them absolutely reproved, proscribed and condemned” (Denzinger 1699).
Pope Pius IX spoke infallibly every time that, in the Encyclical, he condemned errors concerning faith or morals; it is then infallibly that these errors were and remain condemned.
First Editors’ Note: the above, alone, likely does suffice to prove the infallible character of the condemnations found in Quanta Cura, but the universal witness of Catholic theologians to the same is conclusive proof. In other words, Fr. Belmont’s reading is confirmed. The reader is encouraged to visit this survey from Lumen Scholasticum, outlining the arguments from pre-conciliar theologians, universally witnessing to the same.
2. Dignitatis Humanæ is an infallible conciliar act
In fact, the decree states three times that religious freedom is founded on divine Revelation, as it derives from the dignity of man as God revealed it:
§ 2: “It further declares that the right to religious freedom is founded on the dignity of the human person as revealed by the Word of God and reason itself.”
§ 9: “This doctrine of freedom has its roots in divine Revelation, which, for Christians, is one more reason to be holy and faithful to it.”
§ 12: “Therefore, the Church, faithful to the truth of the Gospel, follows the path followed by Christ and the Apostles when she recognizes the principle of religious freedom as in accordance with human dignity and divine Revelation, and when she encourages such freedom.”
Second Editors’ Note: the often misunderstood quote from Paul VI, “Given the pastoral character of the Council, it has avoided making pronouncements, according to the extraordinary mode, of dogmas endowed with the note of infallibility; nevertheless, it has provided its teachings with the authority of the supreme ordinary magisterium”, while ruling out the exercise of the infallible extraordinary magisterium, leaves open the question of engagement of the equally infallible universal and ordinary magisterium [UOM]. Certainly, by invoking divine Revelation to justify a right to religious liberty, Paul VI was electing to have his teaching compared to the sacred deposit of faith. It would be hard to argue such a scenario avoids engaging the infallible UOM. In any case, the general force and authority of the council is confirmed by the very next lines in the quote, which importantly highlight that the council must be understood according to the mind of the conciliar hierarchy, “This magisterium, ordinary and so manifestly authentic, ought to be received sincerely and with docility by all the faithful, according to the mind of the Council concerning the nature and the ends of each document.” (found in the conciliar declaration of March 6th, 1964, repeated on November 16th, 1964).
Belmont’s argument was developed earlier by his teacher, Guérard des Lauriers, who similarly observed, “An Ecumenical Council convoked and approved by the Pope belongs at the very least and by definition to the ordinary universal Magisterium of the Church. Per se, that is, if things are to conform to what their nature requires, the documents that emanate from an assembly of this kind and which formally reveal the light of the Faith [and this is the case of the definition of “religious freedom”] and which deals with a doctrine already infallibly promulgated, are ipso facto promulgated with the mark of infallibility. Vatican II could, strictly speaking, claim itself as “ordinary”: but what it did not, and could not do, was make a promulgation whose clauses canonically imply infallibility, not to be infallible.”
3. Impossibility of a double act of faith
If we stop there, we find ourselves faced with an impossibility: we would have to believe with divine and Catholic faith simultaneously two propositions that cannot be true at the same time: religious freedom (civil freedom in religious matters) is contrary to divine Revelation; religious freedom is in accordance with divine Revelation and is founded on it.
It is therefore impossible to believe at the same time that Pius IX is Pope and that Vatican II is an ecumenical council. It is one thing or the other.
And it is not a free choice that is left to the appreciation of the faithful: it is faith itself, the Catholic faith exercised, that must indicate, without doubt or equivocation, which party it makes necessary to adhere to and which party it makes necessary to reject.
4. Convergence and anteriority
The Catholic faith imperatively makes us adhere to the proposition: Pius IX is Pope, Vatican II is a false council and religious freedom is a false right. And this for two reasons:
— for a second, material reason: religious freedom has often been condemned; this condemnation therefore expresses the perennial doctrine of the Church;
— for a formal and principal reason, the anteriority, vitally integrated into the act of faith. One must not forget to take into account that on earth the Catholic Church lives in time; it is essential to its character as a militant Church .
When Dignitatis Humanæ teaches that religious freedom is founded on divine Revelation, this conciliar declaration is addressed to souls who, by reason of Quanta Cura and the centuries-old teaching and practice of the Church, already believe, within the faith, that said religious freedom is contrary to divine Revelation.
Theological faith forbids the believer (who previously and calmly adheres to Quanta Cura) from questioning his faith again. And so, with the arrival of Dignitatis Humanæ, there are only three possible solutions: absence of contradiction, absence of need to adhere, absence of authority.
Thus, after having verified that there is indeed a contradiction according to the obvious meaning of the texts, after having verified that Dignitatis Humanæ demands adherence of faith, the believer must necessarily refuse his adherence to the text of Dignitatis Humanæ and to the authority that teaches it.
It is, therefore, the Catholic faith that prevents us from considering Vatican II as a true council, and therefore from considering Paul VI (from which Vatican II draws all its authority) as the true Pope.
III.
Let us briefly enumerate the consequences of the teaching of Vatican II, not from the point of view of contradiction, but from the point of view of its content.
1. Religious freedom is not indifferentism, but it inevitably leads to it. Dignitatis Humanæ teaches that religious freedom is a right, and a right has its place in all legislation. But for ordinary Christians (and we are all such), for the poor, for those ut in pluribus, what is legal is moral — or becomes moral very quickly (the promoters of “civil marriage” were counting on this, and they were successful). And so, if all religions must be left legally free, it is because they are morally permitted – the poor say to themselves spontaneously, or little by little. Vatican II does not teach indifferentism, but its religious freedom leads people to it, as surely as all discourses. And perhaps in a more lasting way, since it is modeled on the legislative order.
2. The right affirmed by Dignitatis Humanae may seem peripheral to Catholic doctrine. But it contains in its germ the destruction of the entire moral order. For to affirm that a right (that is, that which is just: jus est justum ) can have an evil object (a false religion) is the very negation of the right. To begin with, we are dealing with a civil right; but we will soon move on to moral right. It is well known that when one wants to introduce a false principle, one does so in a peripheral, or poorly understood, or unimportant domain. Once one has made it accepted, all that remains is to wait…
3. At the heart of religious freedom lies a change in the conception of human nature. What is the deep motivation of Dignitatis Humanæ, what dominates the debates that prepared it, what underlies the entire text, is that freedom is the first attribute of man, his essential characteristic, the foundation of all his rights, the ultimate criterion of social good and evil.
If the terms of the declaration are not so explicit, it is nevertheless from the perspective of freedom, and the freedom claimed, that it sets out, even before evoking God and the need to seek Him and serve Him.
This displacement and hypertrophy of freedom, which, in the natural way of human acts, is promoted to the category of hidden divinity in man, is only expressed by Dignitatis Humanæ in the social order. But since life in society is the natural perfection of human life, it is therefore nature itself that is conceived as primarily finalized by freedom. It is personalism taken to its boiling point, it is the re-edition in causa of non serviam.
4. There is an immediate consequence of the assertion of the false right to civil liberty in religious matters which concerns the conception of the common good of society. This will no longer include, in its constituent elements, the common and peaceful possession of the true religion. This distortion proceeds from a kind of necessity, and manifests it: for the common good is no longer considered as the common impulse, the necessary mutual assistance, for the knowledge of the truth and the realization of good, but as a harmonization of individual freedoms.
5. From then on, the social reign of Jesus Christ is no longer organically linked to the common good: it appears as an “overlaid”, optional, occasional, heterogeneous element in humanity’s march towards freedom, linked to circumstances, at best individual and folkloric. It must give way to the reign of man… a beautiful prospect!
END.
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Before examining the theological notebooks of Bp. Guérard des Lauriers—which carefully and rigorously develop his scholastic thesis for explaining the present crisis in the Catholic Church—it is helpful to start with a summary of his theological position. To this end, Fr. Bernard Lucien has provided a good overview. It can be found in his study entitled, The Problem of Authority in the Post-Conciliar Church.
Still unknown to many today, but changing slowly amongst English speakers, Bp. Guérard des Lauriers was a prominent theologian before the Second Vatican Council, professor at the Pontifical Lateran University until 1961 and author of the Short Critical Study of the New Order of Mass. Colloquially, this study is referred to as The Ottaviani Intervention which, doubtless, many traditional Catholics are familiar with. A fuller picture of the life and theological credentials of des Lauriers can be seen in Fr. Giuseppe Murro’s biography of him.
Worth recalling is that the problems of the Second Vatican Council cannot be neatly reduced to the issue of religious freedom and Dignitatis Humanæ. The council and its reforms have ushered in a universal reform in all areas of the Church. Doctrine, morals, liturgy, discipline, parish life and general attitudes have all changed, the question being—de facto—whether this change is merely accidental, constituting legitimate development, or substantial. If it is the latter case, it must be illegitimate, since the indefectibility of the Church prevents substantial change in her essentials (doctrine, liturgy and discipline which, in turn, affect parish life and general attitudes). Likewise, authentic development cannot admit contradiction. Now, in conjunction with this deductive argument for rupture, the inductive argument is also made by which it is observed that, following the promulgation of the council and subsequent reforms, a multiplicity of acts have been—and continue to be—committed against the supernatural good end of the Catholic Church. Concretely, Paul VI - Leo XIV, while occupying the Apostolic See, materialiter, have and continue to habitually neglect, undermine and contradict said supernatural good-end of the Church. Argued, then, is that this habitual, convergent and objective absence of intention to uphold the good-end is radically incompatible with the possession of Pontifical Authority.
Pope Pius VII, Papal brief Post Tam Diuturnas, (1814), para. 2.
Pope Gregory XVI, Papal encyclical Mirari Vos, (1832), no. 14.
Pope Leo XIII, Papal encyclical Libertas Praestantissimum, (1888), no. 33.
The State is a perfect natural society, composed immediately of families, not individuals, and other imperfect societies (i.e. municipalities, schools and universities, labor unions, corporations, cultural associations, clubs). Like every moral body it has a head, being ruled by Authority, which gives it its form, and the mentioned culpability would be proportionate to the possession of said Authority. In 1930s Spain, for example, that head would have been Gen. Francisco Franco, who faithfully discharged his duty of repressing false religions and only authorized the public practice of Catholicism.
Francis I, Audience on Proper Catechesis, (2021), para. 7.
Two good examples of this kind of arguing are seen and summarily refuted, one by Rev. Brian Harrison and the other by Prof. Thomas Pink.